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THE CLIENT FRAUD PROBLEM:
A JUSTINIAN QUARTET
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
Its a welcome opportunity to be with you. In following the model
set by my predecessors, I take the opportunity to say some things that are
completely irrelevant to the stated topic. First of all, I believe the prose-
cutors and the police and the judges and the defense attorneys are, under
our present system, unmeshed in a legal system and an administrative
system, referring now to the practical facts that Monroe was talking
about, that virtually compels them to cheat upon their formal obligations
under the law. I think that the exclusionary rule is an engine that drives
the police to do much of what they do. My impression is that the police
forty years ago were much more inclined to be more nearly truthful in
their reports of an arrest transaction because they were aware then that
they might get an administrative slap on the wrist but that their cases
would not be dismissed because of infraction.
I don't overlook for a moment all the injustices that led the Supreme
Court to adopt the exclusionary rules. I was brought up in the near
South. Some of you may have even heard of the Sykeston Lynching,
which occurred when I was a child. I didn't really understand what it
was, except that it was horrible. So I don't yield to anybody on aware-
ness of the social conditions that gave rise to the exclusionary rule. As a
former President of the United States said, I'm talking about "a condi-
tion." I would say that the same is true of judges. The judges get fed
this stuff. The example of Judge Beyer illustrates what can happen, what
does happen, what judges who are sensible know will happen. Judges on
the state bench are not in there for life. They don't want to choke, but
they don't want to lose their jobs, and they do what they do.
The defense lawyers are also in the condition that Monroe
described. Systemic malpractice because they don't have time to listen
all the way through to what's relevant in a narrow sense, let alone listen
in the way that a true legal counsellor would, to hear the inner voice of
this person who is now emeshed in the criminal law, which is as bad a
fate as can happen to anyone; to try at least to convey a sense of sympa-
thy, to understand human to human what the defendants face. "We don't
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have time," the defender would say, and he would be right. He's looking
at another bunch of files that might include a case where, as luck would
have it, he might be able to get somebody off as distinct from cutting
their sentence. I adopt everything that Monroe said about that condition.
I adopt everything that Marvin said about the sentencing guidelines. I
think we - the legal profession in particular - are trapped in a system that
drives us to evil conduct.
Much the same thing exists in civil litigation. My friend, Bob Cum-
mins, wondered why we didn't talk about that too. I participate a lot in
civil litigation as a consultant and as an advocate and as an expert wit-
ness. I can tell you that across a wide part of it, it stinks just as much as
criminal justice. I'm participating in hearings now that I don't quite
believe are happening. People are denying that up is "up." It's astonish-
ing then that judges and lawyers are now obfuscating, lying, denying,
because they can't deal with the fact that they have committed grave
professional offenses. And some of these offenses are on the record.
They're not back room.
Why are these occurring? For roughly the same kinds of reasons
that prosecuting lawyers and defense lawyers are doing what they are
doing. Because the pressures have become so severe to get results for
clients, while staying within the rules requires us to produce documents,
to be fully truthful in the evidence we present, etc., etc., etc.
One could say, and people have said, that the criminal law system is
breaking down because it is trying to accomplish more in social virtue,
particularly in the drug field, than our human institutions have capacity
to achieve the results. The same is true of much of our civil regulation
and our regulatory scheme. We are emeshed in a legal system whose
ambitions, substantive and procedural, far outrun the capacity of our
political order to sustain them in a way even approximately conforming
to the norms we profess. Hence, we find ourselves a despised profession
and rightly so. We are monumentally hypocritical in pretending that we
can bring it off when we are demonstrably not pulling it off.
With that happy preface, I want to say I am not ashamed to be a
lawyer. I try to be a virtuous one. I've made mistakes. I make a lot of
judgment calls, some of them are wrong. I think I know what the rules
are. I think I have an idea of the limitations of administered justice and
the limitations of fairness in transactions and I do what I can when I'm
called upon to help in them. I think a lot of my colleagues in the bar do
not have the ability and the sensitivities that measure up to the task.
However, I am deeply sympathetic with the condition that many of them
find themselves in, for reasons I've just suggested.
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It is that social condition in which I have been commissioned now
and then. Presently, in the Law Governing Lawyers and other work of
the ALI, we confront identical problems for the practitioners.
My paper speaks about several different viewpoints of the law. I
want to start with the one that's last in my paper, which is the legislator's
viewpoint. The legislator is the one who is called upon to write rules,
which is what Marvin's and Monroe's and Alan's talk is prefatory to
doing. "After you're all done with the speeches, fellas, what are you
gonna put down in the book?" Many of the issues I think are much more
difficult than the speeches admit. If you take my view, most everything
that was said in all parts of the speeches was correct. If it is all true, then
the draftsman has a real problem.
With particular regard to client fraud, when you get all done with it
that the law says this: a lawyer may not "knowingly," and that's one
word, "assist," and that's another word, a client in committing fraud.
That's a very simple rule. It is in the general law of crimes. It is in the
general law of torts. Its interdicted by the professional rules. The prob-
lem can't therefore lie in the formulation of such a standard. Rather, the
problem is what does one mean by "knowingly," a subject that was
talked about in different ways earlier today, and what do you mean by
"assist." It turns out we have to have a very subtle idea of "knowing"
and "assisting."
Having written the rule as legislature, we are therefore only at the
beginning of the problem from the point of view of practitioners. After
the law giver has spoken, we have to ask to what these utterances mean.
And I want to quickly identify three prospectives from which the mean-
ings are different.
One prospective much talked about today is the trial advocate. My
own view is a combination I think of Marvin's and Monroe's. A lawyer
has to know what's going on but a lawyer cannot acknowledge that he
knows what is going on - that is whether his client is guilty - when the
client goes to trial. Have in mind that most of the cases don't go to trial.
They are settled with a plea bargain. Not because invariably the lawyer
doesn't have time to find out what the case is about, although that is a
serious problem in criminal cases. Not so much a serious problem in
civil cases, because the lawyer does find out what it was about and real-
izes that the client would be foolhardy to go to trial. The lawyer tries to
convey to the client from what is inevitably a judgmental position that
the client would be insane to go to trial because you're not going to win
and if you lose, you're going to be much worse off than if you, as we say,
cop a plea. That's what lawyers do. We are, at the same time, judging
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our clients and acting for them. To emphasize the one role in derogation
of the other is to misunderstand the complexity of the role.
There has to be great subtlety in the lawyer's interpretation to the
client of what the lawyer is doing. If I many quarrel briefly with
Monroe, I think there's a danger in a lawyer thinking of himself as a hero
or a champion. That stance addresses attention to the self of the lawyer,
disregarding the function, which is to do the best job for the client, and
that may well entail passing up the opportunity to look good. Thus, I
may have to look rather timid in order to accomplish the objectives that
would best serve my client. How do I know that will best serve my
client? I have to decide that. Of course, if the client says he wants to go
to trial, we go to trial. However, the client's entitled to know what I
think for real and not some pretended belief cobbled together out of
admonitions that I'm forever his champion. So I have a minor quarrel
with Monroe, on that I think he and I would probably work that out if we
went at it long enough. But that's the trial advocate.
What is the view of this situation from the judge's viewpoint? As
Marvin discovered when he spent some time calling balls and strikes on
the bench, the judge is served up two competing incomplete stories of a
now gone reality. Reality disappeared when the event was accom-
plished. We now have recounts about it. They are stories obviously con-
trived with a view toward their plausibility to a tribunal. The judge is
getting what Solomon got in the case of the two women disputing over
the child. He conducted, as you will recall, a settlement conference.
That is what judges get and judges can't go beyond it. The ambition to
find out what really happened is a useful ideal, but the judge has to
understand that it is one that she is unlikely to accomplish. There's an
enormous ambivalence in that function. I am trying all the time to find
out what really happened and yet I know I won't. Its a familiar experi-
ence. I have encountered it a number of times in dealing with my
children.
I now move to another viewpoint, the transaction lawyer. What
most lawyers do is transactions. Negotiating a criminal case, negotiating
settlement of a civil case is transactional representation. More generally,
we do the negotiation of the real estate deals, the securities statements,
the environmental compliance declarations, the tax returns, etc.
Here, the viewpoint of the rule against knowingly assisting a client
takes on a very different cast, for a simple reason. The lawyer is an actor
in the transaction. The advocate stands away from the transaction look-
ing at it retrospectively and participating in a show and tell about what
happened. The judge witnesses the show and tell. The transaction law-
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yer is doing it. Real time, real events, irreversible, risk laden. Suppose it
turns out that the documents your client has provided to you are false.
How do you deal with that? Any lawyer who doesn't have the ability to
"know" something is dead in that situation. You have to know, apart
from the interest of your client is the interest in your own reputation and
sense of probity. If you don't know whether the deal you have smells,
then you have a fatal deficiency in your olfactory skills. Read the charge
to be read to a jury against the lawyer. A lawyer may be inferred to
know that which someone in his calling and with his competence would
be assumed to know, which is a shorthand rendition of an opinion by
Judge Friendly. So the transaction lawyer has to know. He may have to
abort a transaction, which is essentially to accuse the client engaged in
something that the lawyer doesn't care to be associated with. Is the
transaction one that's within the terms of the law or is it not? Is my
client giving me the straight bill or is he or she not? "What's going on?"
is the question that the lawyer has to answer for himself or herself, in
conditions of incomplete knowledge, uncertainty, changing circum-
stances, and the possibility of very serious consequences.
When we get done with it, the question "can a lawyer know any-
thing?", at least for the transaction lawyer, in my opinion is an empty
question. Of course we have to. Thank you.
1996]
HeinOnline -- 1 J. Inst. for Study Legal Ethics 47 1996
